On August 6th, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan by the United States Army. The bomb successfully exploded instantly killing about 80,000 people and destroying a majority of the physical structure of the city.
Someone with a camera took a series of photographs of the post-bomb carnage. The film exposed by this photographer was brought to a cave outside of town, where it was later discovered by US serviceman Robert Capp. Capp had the film developed and hung on to the images until 1998, when he donated the film to the Hoover Archives with the provision that the photos not be reproduced for another 10 years.
That was ten years ago, and the photographs are now available for you to see.
These pictures are not easy to look at. The photographs are mainly of large numbers of human corpses, many apparently burned. To me, many of these imaged seem to depict bodies that have been accumulated, perhaps pulled from wreckage, as the first stage in disposal. Others are remains clearly in situ at the site of death. They are all gruesome.
I find it fascinating and poignant that these photographs of one of the most horrible moments in human history have become available almost at the same exact time (historically) that documentation of Einstein's atheism also emerge. Einstein, of course, produced some of the science ultimately needed to build a bomb like this one, and followed that act with a lifetime of anti-war and anti-nuclear activism.
I am not suggesting to you any meaning or interpretation of this juxtaposition. I simply mention it as food for thought.
I thank my colleague Christian Reinboth for bringing this astounding collection of photographs to my attention.
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Not sure what's more disturbing- the photos or the comments.
Just to clarify- I'm referring to the comments on the linked site.
A small nit: those bombs were dropped by the US Army. The Air Force wasn't established until 1947.
There are two stories here.
One is told by the pictures, and another is told by the comments people have left.
Both are equally shocking.
Were the Japanese guinea pigs for atomic weaponry? Did the bombs end the war, and thus possibly save thousands of lives?
I think: yes and yes.
I don't believe atomic bombs would have ever been dropped on the Caucasian Germans. I think that there were two bomb drops of two different bomb designs is a major clue that the Japanese civilians were used as test subjects.
I don't believe that the Japanese ruling class would have stopped the war so quickly without a means of the American military to "bring the hurt" so effectively to the Japanese homeland, and not just to the soldiers in the battlefield.
Contemplating the obsequiousness of the American press, and the apathy of the American people, during this 2nd Gulf war, and during the Pentagon Military Analysis Program scandal (The behavior is scandalous, but is there active scandal? No, the press is obsequious and the citizens are apathetic, no scandal): contemplating these both, we will have future generations asking bitter moral questions of our behavior too.
Despite having done considerable reading about the bombings I can't judge the use of the bomb; historically it's too big and too shrouded in secrecy. But I am sickened by the commenters on the linked post who revel in Japanese deaths. Those dead are people like ourselves, like our parents, like our children.
It worries me even more that many cannot accept the possibility that the US ever does any wrong. For all the right wing's yarping about "taking responsibility for our actions" on the individual level (always meaning someone else, not them) they never want to admit that attacks against the US don't just germinate out of nothing.
The bible is full of illogic and myth but one biblical saying that is supported by history is; "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall" We are ultimately in far more danger from our own pride than from any Al Queda terrorist.
WFR: You are correct. My mistake. My dad was in the Air Corps in WWII, in fact. (which was part of the army)
Speaking of my father, his view is similar to what we see in some of these comments and elsewhere, though he was also an anti-war democrat (who in his old age became a ditto-head, but whatever).
He was in the war in Europe. After VE day, he and a zillion other soldiers were brought back across the Atlantic and rushed to California, and from there shipped off to the Pacific to invade Japan. A large percentage of these soldiers never left the US or other intermediate points because VJ day happened soon after VE day.
From an American perspective, a lot of soldiers died in the invasion of Europe, and that was fairly rough. It was anticipated that the invasion of Japan would be ten times worse. This was based on what had happened to date in pushing the Japanese military off of a lot of the Pacific islands they had taken.
The average American soldier was pretty dedicated to kicking the German's buts (again) over a fight in Europe. But they were not as dedicated to fighting an enemy they truly believed to be both sub human and suicidal to liberate a bunch of other crazy funny looking native brown people. Not that my father ever said anything like that, but looking back we see this (and of course I'm generalizing).
So the bombs in Japan made a lot of sense to a lot of people.
But almost every one of those people is dead now. That war is long over and I would hope that our conception of war and the makeup of humanity is advanced. Those comments are shocking.
Nonetheless the nuclear bombs remain at the ready, in large number.
Two sides and a touch of nuance and mythology.
On one the loss of life and injury to civilians is horrendous.
On the other side we used two different designs because we lacked the materials to make two of the same type. We used the bombs as an alternative to a bloody invasion of an island whose leaders had sometimes advocated that the Japanese would literally fight to the last citizen and the total loss would be noble an holy. Are two such attacks, neither as costly in lives as the numbers lost in the fire bombing of Tokyo, not less terrible than the total loss of every citizen in Japan?
It has to be noted that the Japanese staged an air attack after the Nagasaki. Only a few days later would the surrender come. While it is not impossible that demonstrating the bomb on the ocean or a mountain might have been convincing and effective give the Japanese response, failure to surrender, after each attack and the delay after the second it doesn't follow that less dramatic employment would have worked.
A bit of mythology:
The popular story is that the US was at the top of its military game when the bombs were dropped. That we had manpower and the will to invade Japan and finish it in a what was estimated as a potential battle lasting six months.
The reality was that the US was pretty much spent. When we dropped the bomb on Nagasaki we had effectively disarmed our entire nuclear force. We only had two bombs. Another might have been available in a few months.
The marine corp had been decimated by the island war. The army by both Europe and the Pacific campaign. The Navy was wounded by the kamakazi attacks. The nation had been stripped of eligible men to draft. Politically the nation was tired. We were still strong, compared to all other nations, but the bloom was off the rose.
Frank estimates of what it would cost in casualties to invade Japan and take it house by house, in part using the Russian example and losses taking Berlin as a model, calculated that the US army and marines would cease to exist as a force. We could have done it. But it would have been unimaginably costly.
The mythology that we were unsullied by the war and that we gratuitously dropped bombs does tend to make us look like arrogant bullies. Understanding that the best of American manpower had already been tapped. That the US would be militarily crippled had it invaded. That the nuclear option was in part a last ditch chance to avoid a terrible end, for both the US and to prevent he need to exterminate the entirety of the Japanese people, makes the bombings look much less a bloodthirsty act committed by bullies unwilling to get their hands dirty.
The Japanese were already willing to surrender, and American brass was well aware of it. The difficulty was out policy of unconditional surrender, which a moments introspection should reveal to the even partially empathy-capable observer is an invitation to unconditional resistance. The odd fact is that the surrender offered by Japan (and rejected by us) only involved assuring the position of the emperor. Given that Hirohito remained in his position until 1989, it would appear the main rationale behind our rebuffing of the surrender terms was, in the end, pointless.
It sickens me to watch anyone attempt to rationalize mass slaughter, but nationalism is indeed a powerful influence.
Three words: Operation August Storm.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_August_Storm
Tyler,
I would recommend that you do more research, if you believe that the government of Japan after the war a powerless figurehead-Emperor as the figurative sovereign over a modern, democrat state bear any resemblance to that which was offered by the Japanese militarists in their "surrender offer."
Moreover, your citing a call for "unconditional surrender" as a cause of "unconditional resistance" is backwards. The notion that the Japanese people would do anything other than "unconditional resistance" would have been found to be a shameful insult as being against the Yamato spirit and the code of bushito to some of the Japanese at the time. The American actions were an attempt to convince the Japanese that such "unconditional resistance" as was seen, for example, at Okinawa, were simple a waste.
The American actions were not taken headlessly, but in the understanding borne in the ashes of WWI and the rise of Hitlerism was can come about from something less than "unconditional surrender."
Tyler,
I would recommend that you do more research, if you believe that the government of Japan after the war -- a powerless figurehead-Emperor as the figurative sovereign over a modern, democrat state -- bears any resemblance to that which was offered by the Japanese militarists in their "surrender offer."
Moreover, your citing a call for "unconditional surrender" as a cause of "unconditional resistance" is backwards. The notion that the Japanese people would do anything other than "unconditional resistance" would have been found to be a shameful insult -- as being against the Yamato spirit and the code of bushito -- to some of the Japanese at the time. "Unconditional resistance" was what both sides expected the Japanese to do, even before the Cairo declaration or the Potsdam declaration. The American actions were an attempt to convince the Japanese that such "unconditional resistance" as was seen, for example, at Okinawa, were simple a waste and would be futile and pointless.
The American actions were not taken headlessly, but in the understanding -- borne in the ashes of WWI and the rise of Hitlerism -- of what can come about from something less than "unconditional surrender."
Hasn't it been claimed that dropping these bombs in Japan was also a message to the Soviet Union?
Re manuelg
"I don't believe atomic bombs would have ever been dropped on the Caucasian Germans"
This comment is piffle. Does Mr. manuelg think that the US and Britain, who had no compunction whatever about the firebombing of Dresden, would have hesitated for as much as a second at using nuclear bombs on Germany? Not a bit of it.
"I would recommend that you do more research, if you believe that the government of Japan after the war -- a powerless figurehead-Emperor as the figurative sovereign over a modern, democrat state -- bears any resemblance to that which was offered by the Japanese militarists in their "surrender offer.""
According to the terms of the Meiji Restoration, the Emperor of Japan was already a largely ceremonial post. Japan was a military dictatorship where the true power lied in the hands on the generals (indeed, one of the semi-plausible arguments I've heard in the direction of not accepting the Japanese surrender was that if a contingent of generals decided to continue fighting on, the emperor could not have prevented them from doing so).
"Moreover, your citing a call for "unconditional surrender" as a cause of "unconditional resistance" is backwards."
Of course the Japanese are going to fight to protect their homeland from an invader demanding unconditional surrender (the fighting in Okinowa and Saipan is indicative of that, since the Japanese considered that national territory, the latter since the early 17th. century). We would do well to remember that the power demanding unconditional surrender had become infamous for it's brutalization of the Philipines barely four decades prior, not to mention the treatment of the native Americans during the westward expansion. One cannot say for certain that Japanese had no reason to fear American retribution in the case of unconditional surrender, and it is a myth that no other course of action than dropping the bomb to overcome such could have been achieved.
"The American actions were not taken headlessly, but in the understanding -- borne in the ashes of WWI and the rise of Hitlerism -- of what can come about from something less than "unconditional surrender.""
I can't believe that you're actually trying to argue that the aftermath of WWI is a data point in your favor. Hitler didn't rise to power because the allies were far too lenient in their surrender terms. Germany's resentment from being disarmed, demobilized and nailed with harsh economic sanctions is indicative of what people feared could come from an unconditional surrender.
"According to the terms of the Meiji Restoration, the Emperor of Japan was already a largely ceremonial post. "
The entire Meiji Restoration was the restoration of imperial rule from the rule of the Shogunate (wherein Emperor "reigned but did not rule"). The Meiji Constitution detailed the power of the Emperor to rule though his ministers, in concert with the Diet. The current emperor has no such constitutional role.
"Japan was a military dictatorship where the true power lied in the hands on the generals ..."
The degree to which Hirohito exercised/influenced this exercise of power is a point of great contention. Hirohito's actual power during WWII is believed by some as being much greater than the picture of the "caged chrysanthemum" that Hirohito-apologists proffer and which was found to be so useful by MacArthur. I believe that Hideki Tojo's citing of Hirohito as the ultimate authority, later recanted at the insistence/coaching of the Americans, is a case in point.
But, more to the point, even under the Japanese "surrender offers," most of these same militarists believed that they would continue to rule Japan under the same system. "Retention of the Emperor" actually entailed "retention of the imperial system" -- the same system under which Japan started the wars against China, US, etc.
"Of course the Japanese are going to fight to protect their homeland from an invader demanding unconditional surrender (the fighting in Okinowa and Saipan is indicative of that, since the Japanese considered that national territory, the latter since the early 17th. century)."
But the Japanese fought with "unconditional resistance" even when they were not protecting their homeland, but were expanding the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." It wasn't just a defensive posture.
"We would do well to remember that the power demanding unconditional surrender had become infamous for it's brutalization of the Philipines barely four decades prior, not to mention the treatment of the native Americans during the westward expansion."
And is all irrelevant. The attitude of the Japanese soldiers and people were not dependant upon the manner in which the Americans treated the Filipinos and the Native Americans; it was derived from the Japanese culture, itself. Surrender was shame to them, so they would fight to the death, even when there was no point to doing so.
"One cannot say for certain that Japanese had no reason to fear American retribution in the case of unconditional surrender, and it is a myth that no other course of action than dropping the bomb to overcome such could have been achieved."
That is true; the Japanese knew what they, themselves, did to other peoples when they were in the superior position. However, upon their surrender, they were not treated by the Americans, as in the manner in which they, themselves, had acted against, for example, the Chinese.
I think that while the bombings were not the only answer, they probably saved more lives, American and Japanese, than any of the other options which reasonable have been considered by the Americans.
"I can't believe that you're actually trying to argue that the aftermath of WWI is a data point in your favor. Hitler didn't rise to power because the allies were far too lenient in their surrender terms. Germany's resentment from being disarmed, demobilized and nailed with harsh economic sanctions is indicative of what people feared could come from an unconditional surrender."
I'm citing it, because, factually, it was one of the motivations of the Allied Powers. They believed (rightly or wrongly) that the rise of Hitler was built, in part, on the idea of der Dolchstoss: the belief that the Germans unfairly suffered under Versailles because they were "stabbed in the back" by weak leaders on the home front and that they, the Germans, did not truly "lose" the First World War.
It was only through unconditional surrender -- through making the enemy have no illusions that the war was wholly, completely and utterly lost -- that the Allied leaders believed they might avoid a similar fate in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Thank you for pointing out these photographs. Rather coincidentally, I just explained how nuclear bombs work to my high school chem class this morning. I'm not sure if I should show these pictures (I have a video taken by the army that's bad enough). In the past, I have introduced students to the kind of discussion I see here and at the photo website. I don't know if I should. I find that it is very hard for people to get an objective perspective - most people seem to pick a side and defend it with absurdities: either, "those bastards deserved what they got", or "those poor innocents were murdered". The truth is obviously more nuanced. Truman thought what we did was right for a number of reasons, which probably included showing the Soviet Union they should fear the U.S. It is also true that thousands of people were killed because of where they happened to be born. The apologists who say they have no feelings for them are actually the same type as the people who controlled Japan at the time: brutal, racist, war mongers. Even so, I am suspicious of the judgemental opinions of those who are currently safe and comfortable.
Uncle Noel,
If you are using these lessons to teach your students how to analyze complex, nuanced situations, then you are doing the right thing in educating them. If you are just showing them these discussions to illustrate how atoms come together and the physical reactions that ensue (is that a chemsitry lesson or a physics lesson), then you are missing an opportunity. People can handle nuances if they feel empowered to make their own sound judgements. So use the photos and teach - but get relases signed first. That way your lawyers will be happy too.
Uncle Noel,
If you are using these lessons to teach your students how to analyze complex, nuanced situations, then you are doing the right thing in educating them. If you are just showing them these discussions to illustrate how atoms come together and the physical reactions that ensue (is that a chemsitry lesson or a physics lesson), then you are missing an opportunity. People can handle nuances if they feel empowered to make their own sound judgements. So use the photos and teach - but get relases signed first. That way your lawyers will be happy too.
For what it's worth, Sean Malloy, author of "Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan" has, apparently, evidence questioning the attibution of some of these photos to the atomic bombing:
http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/smalloy/atomic_tragedy/photos.html
Philip: Thanks for the advice. My concern is that most of my students - like many of the commentors - won't have the emotional maturity to deal with the difficult issues brought up by these photos and I really don't have enough time. My curriculum specifies teaching basic nuclear reactions - it's called "nuclear chemistry" even though it's really physics. But I will show "The Atomic Bomb Movie"; an excellent review of the development of the Bomb.
Noel: Why not have a talk with your favorite social studies teacher? This would be an interesting inter-disciplinary topic.
"But, more to the point, even under the Japanese "surrender offers," most of these same militarists believed that they would continue to rule Japan under the same system. "Retention of the Emperor" actually entailed "retention of the imperial system" -- the same system under which Japan started the wars against China, US, etc."
Japan's military was effectively slain, they had virtually no navy, airforce, oil, gas or other natural resources with which to reconstitute any kind of force. One would be hard pressed to find any feasible way the commanding officers would've been able to retain authority after surrender. And without that, what remains is a ceremonial imperial post with Hirohito himself not being subject to war crimes trials after the conclusion of the war, both of which came to pass in the end anyway.
"Surrender was shame to them, so they would fight to the death, even when there was no point to doing so."
You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. If surrender was such a shame that they would fight even given that there was no point, then why did they surrender after the mere loss of only 200,000 people? The Japanese brass were already well aware of the fact that they had lost the war, given that they had already offered surrender. "Fight to the last man" may have been used as propaganda, but it was obviously not in close alignment with reality.
"That is true; the Japanese knew what they, themselves, did to other peoples when they were in the superior position. However, upon their surrender, they were not treated by the Americans, as in the manner in which they, themselves, had acted against, for example, the Chinese."
I'm not denying the Japanese war crimes during WWII, just FYI.
Also, regarding the comparisons to the "conditional" surrender of Germany in the conclusion of WWI, the scenarios are not comparable for another reason. The situation fell apart with the rise of Hitlerism for one reason and one reason only: the European powers lacked the capability the enforce the surrender terms when it came down to crunch time. America was in no comparable position, as it not only had a very capable military but an industrial infrastructure that went from world class to roided-up due to the immense demands of wartime production.
"Japan's military was effectively slain, they had virtually no navy, airforce, oil, gas or other natural resources with which to reconstitute any kind of force. One would be hard pressed to find any feasible way the commanding officers would've been able to retain authority after surrender."
But the point was, that they were offering a negotiated peace whereby there would be no occupation, no foreign war crimes tribunals, no reconstitution of the Japanese polity and no foreign oversight of any disarmament. The question in that negotiation would be how much of the Japanese conquest they would be permitted to keep and other wholly external matters. They assuredly were not offering "Potsdam with special provisions for Hirohito." (And their final acceptance was, in fact, an acceptance of "Potsdam with special provisions for Hirohito." The Allies ignored the addendum, and considered it an unconditional surrender. As it turned out, they found Hirohito useful, so it was a useful fiction, at any rate; they got to claim unconditional surrender, and the Japanese got to claim the protection of the body of the Emperor, if not the protection of his office and his godhood.)
"And without that, what remains is a ceremonial imperial post with Hirohito himself not being subject to war crimes trials after the conclusion of the war, both of which came to pass in the end anyway."
What would have occurred would have been the continuation of the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial powers and prerogatives inherent in that document. If anything, it is likely that if such a surrender as was being offered were accepted by the Allies, the Emperor would have been in an even stronger position, being perhaps the only national political leader would could command respect across the society and could have been a unifying force. (Which was what MacArthur used him for.)
"You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. If surrender was such a shame that they would fight even given that there was no point, then why did they surrender after the mere loss of only 200,000 people?"
Because the one person who could command the entire nation to "endure the unendurable" and "accept the unacceptable" -- Hirohito -- directed them to do so. He decided that he did not wish to see the "honorable death of the hundred million" (i.e., the death of every Japanese man, woman and child), which was the only feasable alternative which he could see and which was on the table, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the entry of Russia into the war.
"The Japanese brass were already well aware of the fact that they had lost the war, given that they had already offered surrender. 'Fight to the last man' may have been used as propaganda, but it was obviously not in close alignment with reality."
Not at all true. There were many who did not believe that a non-negotiated surrender, even as an alternative to annihilation, was something which they could accept. Even after Hirohito recorded the message to the Japanese people accepting the terms of surrender, the Hantanaka coup sought to take Hirohito into "protective custody", destroy the recording, prevent the acceptance of the surrender and continue to fight on, in the belief that doing so would have been the Emperor's "true" wish, if he was not "misled" by his advisors.
Was there a "peace camp" who was looking to end the war at near any cost? Sure. And they won out at the end when Hirohito agreed with them. But they never offered an offer of peace that was reasonably acceptable to the Allies.
"Also, regarding the comparisons to the 'conditional' surrender of Germany in the conclusion of WWI, the scenarios are not comparable for another reason."
Perhaps, but that doesn't change the fact that the Allies, at the time, believed it to be a valid consideration and that belief motivated their decision making regarding the demand for unconditional surrender.
"But the point was, that they were offering a negotiated peace whereby there would be no occupation, no foreign war crimes tribunals, no reconstitution of the Japanese polity and no foreign oversight of any disarmament. The question in that negotiation would be how much of the Japanese conquest they would be permitted to keep and other wholly external matters."
There were divisions within Japan as to which surrender terms would eventually be offered. Imperial confidant Koichi Kido insisted upon approaching the Allies with many more concessions, including the disarmament of Japan's military with the exception of a minimal force for maintaining order. This was, IIRC, before they suffered defeat at Okinowa and had the Soviets abandon the neutrality pact. That is only to point out that a negotiation of more favorable terms to the Allies was not dead in the water, and that dropping the bombs was at least not an immediate necessity absent our demand for "unconditional surrender".
"Because the one person who could command the entire nation to "endure the unendurable" and "accept the unacceptable" -- Hirohito -- directed them to do so."
Judging by the fact that Hirohito authorized one of his top aids (Kido) to approach the supreme council with a proposal for more generous surrender terms, Hirohito was already leaning in such a direction in any case, and after Okinowa we know was pessimistic about Japan's ability to continue military conflict. Could he have been nudged further in that direction had we been more lenient? Can't know for sure, but remember that what hanged in the balance were the lives of 200,000 civilians.
"Not at all true. There were many who did not believe that a non-negotiated surrender, even as an alternative to annihilation, was something which they could accept...
......
Was there a "peace camp" who was looking to end the war at near any cost? Sure. And they won out at the end when Hirohito agreed with them. But they never offered an offer of peace that was reasonably acceptable to the Allies."
Negotiation is typically a two-way street. America's demand of unconditional surrender could only be seen as galvanizing the delusional elements of the Japanese military who still thought it worthwhile to continue to fight. Instead dismissing surrender terms out of hand, the allies could have offered a renegotiation.
I think that our American History class gets to this discussion, but I'm not sure to what end. I did mention the debate to my students, but we didn't spend much time on it and it seems like it wasn't as important to them as to the commenters here and at the photo site. After all, this is ancient history to a 17 yr old.
Tyler: I recently heard a historian say, "No Great Power behaves morally. No exceptions." Your hindsight second guessing of the Bombing, seen in that light, is facile: those who would have made a different decision wouldn't have been in position to make it. You are correct that a more moral option was probably available to the U.S. But concern for the welfare of those identified as the enemy is just not a priority in war. This is why war is bad. It is immoral. And the Japanese were just as responsible as the Americans for what happened.
"That is only to point out that a negotiation of more favorable terms to the Allies was not dead in the water, and that dropping the bombs was at least not an immediate necessity absent our demand for 'unconditional surrender'."
But why would the Allies negotiate against themselves? They had all the cards, and the only thing that kept the Japanese in the game, so to speak, was their unwillingness to give up. It may be "understandable" for them to refuse to do so, but it doesn't excuse their culpability in the matter.
Further, your presumption is that any negotiated resolution would have been preferable to a fight until the complete capitulation of Japan. That presumption was not shared by the Allied populace or politicians, nor was it unreasonable to not share that presumption.
"Could he have been nudged further in that direction had we been more lenient? Can't know for sure, but remember that what hanged in the balance were the lives of 200,000 civilians."
But why would the Allies -- circa 1945 -- be lenient toward Japan at all?? This was a government which sneak-attacked without warning and fought, tortured, raped and murdered -- as military policy -- without mercy for years, instituted horrific occupations driven by a racist vision of Japanese superiority against not just non-Asians (which would have been bad enough), but against non-Japanese. They committed the most horrific of war crimes against soldiers and civilians all across Asia for years. And you expect that the Allies should have been lenient?? Justice demanded that Japan be shown no leniency.
Your whole position puts the onus on the Allies to do everything in their power to avoid these casualties (who were not all civilians, by the way). That makes no sense. The Japanese knew that they could stop the killing of Japanese civilians at any moment simply by accepting the terms of Cairo and Potsdam. They chose not do so -- and never signalled publically to the Allies and their own populace that they wanted to do so -- until they were forced to by Hirohito, after facing the expected consequences of their actions.
Further, the death of these 200,000 probably resulted in saving the lives of many more, both Japanese and Americans. And, even if their deaths saved the lives of, say, 5,000 American GIs, it is neither unreasonable nor immoral for the US population and its leaders to choose to save the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of its enemy.
"Negotiation is typically a two-way street. America's demand of unconditional surrender could only be seen as galvanizing the delusional elements of the Japanese military who still thought it worthwhile to continue to fight. Instead dismissing surrender terms out of hand, the allies could have offered a renegotiation."
But the Allies didn't dismiss surrender terms out of hand, the Japanese did. They reacted to the Potsdam Declaration not by proposing a counter offer of surrender or begging for surrender terms or acknowledging defeat or even offering to open negotiations, but by public announcing that they would "kill it with silence," which was a sign of contempt, and to boast that they would "do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war."
The fact is that these two sides had different strategic goals, and neither was willing to move until Nagasaki. If that didn't happen, it would have been Olympic and Coronet, which probably would have killed many more people.
Noel,
I don't disagree. My position has always been that those who have the benefit of historical hindsight often overlook the fact that, in a war, atrocities are committed (war is an atrocity in itself, although sometimes an unavoidable one). My argument is against those who, in the spirit of Grant Canyon (presumably, unless I'm misreading him), deny that the bombing was an atrocity in the first place.
Continuing with Grant,
"But why would the Allies negotiate against themselves? They had all the cards, and the only thing that kept the Japanese in the game, so to speak, was their unwillingness to give up. It may be "understandable" for them to refuse to do so, but it doesn't excuse their culpability in the matter."
I'm not trying to eliminate Japanese culpability in their failure to recognize reality and surrender, but the specific course of action taken by the allies also renders them culpable. Furthermore, the fact that the allies had all the cards in part of my point. We had the overwhelming upper-hand and did not exhaust possible alternatives to massacring a large number of civilians before resorting to it. That is, at the very least, a huge moral failing on our part. In terms of negotiation, we never even offered what was eventually accepted anyway: surrender terms that involved a guarantee that the Japanese could keep their Emperor, who we knew was an important figurehead and whose fate we knew was a huge factor in the course of action the Japanese took.
"Further, your presumption is that any negotiated resolution would have been preferable to a fight until the complete capitulation of Japan. That presumption was not shared by the Allied populace or politicians, nor was it unreasonable to not share that presumption."
It is certain that most of the populace and politicians shared such a position (with a modification, as I'm not saying that "any" resolution would have been preferable, but that we should have attempted to reach a more favorable resolution before we decided to drop the bomb). I don't have a reference handy, but I remember reading that contemporaneous polling indicated that anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of Americans found it proper that Japan be annihilated entirely. But the revenge-mindedness, nationalism and racism of the polities and populations of other countries do not excuse atrocities for them, so they by extension do not excuse them for us.
"They committed the most horrific of war crimes against soldiers and civilians all across Asia for years. And you expect that the Allies should have been lenient?? Justice demanded that Japan be shown no leniency."
And this is all irrelevant unless you take the position that Japanese civilians deserved the bombing because of the actions of their government and military, or even more bizarrely that "justice demanded" that we reciprocate such atrocities. For reference, Osama bin Laden also takes that position with regard to his brutal attacks on American civilians on 9/11 and elsewhere. Common human decency dictates otherwise. As for the issue of leniency itself, one could argue that we did ultimately show such anyway, as the Japanese were granted a concession that no other Axis powers were following surrender. Hirohito, an influential and important figurehead of the government that committed such atrocities, was not subject to any war-crimes tribunals and remained in a ceremonial position until 1989.
"Further, the death of these 200,000 probably resulted in saving the lives of many more, both Japanese and Americans. And, even if their deaths saved the lives of, say, 5,000 American GIs, it is neither unreasonable nor immoral for the US population and its leaders to choose to save the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of its enemy."
For one thing, you're insisting that the deaths of so many civilians was to be taken for granted anyway. While it is true that naval blockades or ground invasions probably would have resulted in more deaths overall, those were not the only options available. Did they offer a modified postdam with an unequivocal guarantee that the Emperor would not be subject to warcrimes tribunals? No. Did they drop the bomb in an uninhabited area and allow the Japanese to survey the damage, with the notice that we would go further if need be? No. Other feasible avenues were not exhausted and that makes the action of dropping the bomb unjustifiable.
"I don't disagree. My position has always been that those who have the benefit of historical hindsight often overlook the fact that, in a war, atrocities are committed (war is an atrocity in itself, although sometimes an unavoidable one). My argument is against those who, in the spirit of Grant Canyon (presumably, unless I'm misreading him), deny that the bombing was an atrocity in the first place."
Oh, I don't deny that they were atrocities. (Indeed, the bombings weren't even the largest atrocity in the war from the Allied side. I think, in terms of sheer pain suffered, the Tokyo fire and Dresden bombing probably inflicted more pain, by virtue of the fact that many of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki died near instantly and suffered little, if at all, whereas deaths in Tokyo and Dresden involved suffocation, smoke inhalation and burning.) My position is not that "the bombings were not an atrocity," but, rather, that it was the least bad choice (from the American perspective), given their strategic goals, political limitations/requirements, and available resources. It was one of those situations were there were only bad choices.
"I'm not trying to eliminate Japanese culpability in their failure to recognize reality and surrender, but the specific course of action taken by the allies also renders them culpable. Furthermore, the fact that the allies had all the cards in part of my point. We had the overwhelming upper-hand and did not exhaust possible alternatives to massacring a large number of civilians before resorting to it. That is, at the very least, a huge moral failing on our part."
I understand that you aren't trying to eliminate Japanese culpability, but I think that the fact that the Allies gave the Japanese a chance to end the war (albeit on terms not agreeable to the Japanese) without the bombings constituted all the Allies could reasonably have been expected to do, at that stage in the war. Had the Japanese made any public pronouncement other than that they would kill the Allies' demand with silence and that they would continue to fight, then perhaps the onus would have been on the Allies to come up with a lesser demand. But the fact of the matter is that the Japanese didn't express anything but contempt for the demand for surrender certainly lessens any moral obligation on the Allies to do more.
"In terms of negotiation, we never even offered what was eventually accepted anyway: surrender terms that involved a guarantee that the Japanese could keep their Emperor, who we knew was an important figurehead and whose fate we knew was a huge factor in the course of action the Japanese took."
You keep saying "negotiation"... But the Japanese rejected the concept of negotiations. The Allies made their initial demands and the Japanese said, in essence, "screw you, we're fighting to the bloody end." Since they didn't make any counter offer to our initial demand, there was no negotiation, so there was no reason for the Allies to make this concession. And it was not at all certain, before the occupation began, that we would not prosecute Hirohito for his crimes. The fact that MacArthur found him useful in governing Japan after the war was the only reason why he didn't suffer the punishment he deserved.
"It is certain that most of the populace and politicians shared such a position (with a modification, as I'm not saying that 'any' resolution would have been preferable, but that we should have attempted to reach a more favorable resolution before we decided to drop the bomb). I don't have a reference handy, but I remember reading that contemporaneous polling indicated that anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of Americans found it proper that Japan be annihilated entirely."
There is a difference between total annihilation and unconditional surrender. The American population was tired of war and wanted to see the war end, for sure. But they wanted it ended with Allied victory, regardless of whether Japanese civilians suffered the cost. They believed that it was better that Japanese civilians suffer rather than the American and other Allied soldiers. That's why the US population was overwhelmingly in favor of the atomic bombings. Indeed, about 1/4 of the population regretted that we did not use more of them.
Most of the population would not have supported ending the war with something that was not the substantial equivalent of unconditional surrender. (I think the poll numbers were, like, 90-10, even if it required an invasion of the home islands.) The kind of surrender that the Japanese could have potentially agreed to prior to the bombings were not the result which the American people would have accepted.
"But the revenge-mindedness, nationalism and racism of the polities and populations of other countries do not excuse atrocities for them, so they by extension do not excuse them for us."
Well, "revenge-mindedness", "nationalism" and "racism" are three totally different things, not at all naturally lumped together. And, indeed, the first two are not even per se objectionable, like the last is, especially as it pertains to the policy of a nation as opposed to personal morality. And I disagree with your unspoken premise that "revenge-mindedness" and "nationalism" can never justify (which is, I believe, a better word than "excuse" in this context) atrocities like the atomic bombings. It may not make them morally correct, but they can certainly justify such actions, under certain circumstances. Truman and the Allies faced such circumstances.
"And this is all irrelevant unless you take the position that Japanese civilians deserved the bombing because of the actions of their government and military, or even more bizarrely that 'justice demanded' that we reciprocate such atrocities."
Not that the Japanese civilians "deserved the bombings because of the actions of their government and military" but that the actions of their government and military destroyed any reasonable expectation or claim that the Japanese civilians could have had that the Allies would take the Japanese civilian's interests into consideration in formulating their strategic and tactical decisions.
It is the difference between gratuitously bombing, on the one hand (which is the equivalent of saying that the civilians "deserved" the bombing); not bombing out of moral considerations even though it would have advanced the strategic results (which is the equivalent of the course I assume you would have preferred); and bombing notwithstanding the moral considerations because it advanced the strategic results sought (which I'm saying is justified [even if it is not moral] in light of the Japanese atrocities.)
"As for the issue of leniency itself, one could argue that we did ultimately show such anyway, as the Japanese were granted a concession that no other Axis powers were following surrender. Hirohito, an influential and important figurehead of the government that committed such atrocities, was not subject to any war-crimes tribunals and remained in a ceremonial position until 1989."
But that was not done out of any sense of leniency, but because it furthered the Allied occupation. It was a way of saying to the Japanese people "not only you, but Hirohito himself, were wrongly guided by the militarists. We will rebuild your society so that that can't happen again." But if it would have advanced the occupation aims to hang Hirohito, he would have hanged. It was not leniency as much as it was pragmatism.
"For one thing, you're insisting that the deaths of so many civilians was to be taken for granted anyway. While it is true that naval blockades or ground invasions probably would have resulted in more deaths overall, those were not the only options available."
But they were the only options which carried the potential to actually end the war on terms that the Allies were willing to accept, in light of the Japanese disdainful dismissal of Potsdam.
"Did they offer a modified postdam with an unequivocal guarantee that the Emperor would not be subject to warcrimes tribunals? No."
Again, why would they have offered this? Japan expressed no interest in negotiations and expressed no willingness to surrender. There was also a believe among the Allies that Hirohito should hang for his crimes. Were the Allied expected to offer demand after demand, each time giving up more and more to the Japanese, until the Japanese got what they wanted?? Why in the world would the Allies do that? Where is it in their strategic interest to do so?
"Did they drop the bomb in an uninhabited area and allow the Japanese to survey the damage, with the notice that we would go further if need be? No."
A lot of people bring this option up, but I am dumbfounded that people believe this course of events could have accomplished anything. First, where, exactly, would you have proposed the bomb to have been dropped? Any area that is sufficiently uninhabited to be an appropriate target probably is barren wilderness with insufficient infrastructure or materials (natural or man made) to generate enough "damage" to investigate. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were both air-burst weapons, and the damage primarily came from the heat generated by the explosion setting fire to the buildings and from the shock wave (pressure wave) which collapsed the infrastructure. (Indeed, portions of the base of the Trinity tower, which was only 60 feet tall, survived the test blast at Alamogordo.) Absent that infrastructure and materials, you would have had nothing but a bright light, a big bang and a bunch of scorched earth. Probably not enough to convince die-hard militarists to abandon their approach.
Further, there is the down side risks. Any sufficiently useful test would require the Japanese to witness the event. That would entail risking the interception of the bomber or the recovery of the weapon if it failed to detonate. Though small risks, they were still significant.
Moreover, it goes against the evidence to think that the mere examination of damage, itself, could convince the Japanese. At this point in the war, we had so thoroughly leveled Japanese cities that the bombers were running out of targets. Not military target, mind you, but strategic targets. Basically, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, and Nagasaki stood, because they were set aside as potential targets for the atomic bomb. The country was literally little but damage. The Japanese did not need to go far to see the kind of damage the Allies could inflict, but that was not enough.
Finally, there is the macabre fact that this "test" was actually performed, but not on a barren wilderness, but on the city of Hiroshima. By the end of that day, the Japanese knew what hit them, that it took a single bomber to deliver the weapon, that the destructive power was massive, and had "notice that we would go further if need be." Even with that example, they did not surrender, and proceeded to fight on. Even after Nagasaki was destroyed, there was still those in the power structure who wanted to fight. If losing a city did not do the job, what makes you think that witnessing the bomb explode on the slope of Fuji-san would have done the trick??
"Other feasible avenues were not exhausted and that makes the action of dropping the bomb unjustifiable."
Only if you believe that there is an exhaustion requirement. I don't believe that the Allies had to exhaust every option, regardless of what that option was, prior to taking action which they believed was necessary to end the war and protect the Allied lives.
Tyler, you are claiming that Americans were morally obligated to behave differently than the Japanese; and, in effect, to care more about them than they cared about themselves (they knew hundreds of thousands could be killed even without an atomic bomb). You may be right, but you're not going to get many people to agree with you. If bombing Hiroshima would end the war the day before your brother got killed, would you choose a different action? Well, someone's brother would have been killed. Truman's job was to protect Americans, not the Japanese. It's not always clear where to draw the line between an "atrocity" and "justifiable action" in war. I think the discussion is useful, but it's ultimately a matter of opinion, is it not?
Art. (| May 14, 2008 1:03 AM)
There is so much wrong with your comment, I barely know where to start.
"we used two different designs because we lacked the materials to make two of the same type."
Hogwash, they were alternative technologies. There was enough capacity to research and build two alternative designs. Both were successful, both were used.
"We used the bombs as an alternative to a bloody invasion of an island whose leaders had sometimes advocated that the Japanese would literally fight to the last citizen"
Sometimes? No frequently. The war party in Japan had often said that.
But the fact is that both the war faction and the "peace" faction were agreed that Japan's capacity to fight was finished. What they were fighting over were conditions. After Potsdam, the three main Allied powers - USA, UK and Soviet Union - had agreed on unconditional surrender. The Japanese knew this, but the war party - the majority - were holding out for conditional preservation of the imperial family and the structure of the Japanese state. The peace faction wanted to preserve the Japanese homeland. Promising the second class citizens of Okinawa full participation in Japanese society to encourage them to fight to the death (which they did) was one - thoughrally barbaric - thing. Risking the sanctity of the home islands another.
And guess what? MacArthur, as American Viceroy, gave the war party exactly what they wanted - preservation of the Japanese nation (they still fly the Rising Sun you know) but only after they had unconditionally surrendered. That he did that as a piece of pragmatic politics is neither here nor there. The war was close to an end and would have happened very soon without the bombs.
The war party were finished. They had just sent their flagship out as a sort of sea-going kamikazi vessel to see it sunk, large parts of their remaining fleet had been sunk or damaged in raids. They were even running out of kamikazi, the US Navy could have shown up in Tokyo Bay and started shelling the palace like Commodore Perry if they really wanted to.
The only discussion in Japan was "sue for peace with conditions and preserve the Empire" vs "give up"
And then you have this rot: "The reality was that the US was pretty much spent. When we dropped the bomb on Nagasaki we had effectively disarmed our entire nuclear force. We only had two bombs. "
Disarmed? How? How do you disarm something that never existed? Yes, there were only two bombs, but that's not the question. Your point is completely moot, are you saying the weapons were ineffective and a subsequent invasion was necessary? An invasion of a spent nation, acheived by simply showing up and watching while the Japanese put their hands in the air because they had nothing left to fight with? Which is exactly what happened anyway?
As for being spent, the entire Pacific war was largely fought with only the Marines - who were not a large force. MacArthur had relatively light casualties, compared to those in Europe. And then the entire Army, a much larger force - who'd been pretty much uninvolved in the Pacific - had suddenly become available after the end of the war in Europe.
"We were still strong, compared to all other nations"
Japan perhaps? If the US was "off the bloom", Japan was stiffed, in the coffin and just waiting for the last few nails.
"But it would have been unimaginably costly."
Rubbish. See above, and compare with the Emperer's statement of surrender. He says that he is unwilling to see the Japanese people suffer anymore, or to allow them to be overrun by gaigen (means 'barbarian') hordes.
"Are two such attacks, neither as costly in lives as the numbers lost in the fire bombing of Tokyo,"
You contradict yourself. Either the nuclear attacks - which killed fewer people than months of fire bombing - were so utterly terrifying that they compelled surrender, or they were simply the icing on the cake. Two words. Kurile Islands. Also see "Treaty of San Francisco, 1951"
The Soviet Union invaded the islands at the end of the war and their continued incursion would have caused a partition of Japan like in Europe. The use of the of nuclear weapons was purely a geopolitical action to demonstrate superior power to the Soviet Union, with the Japanese as guini pigs.
It had nothing to do with the ahistorical mythology you have absorbed.
That is, unless you regard Truman as a war criminal, because there is no moral case to be made for the use of the bomb, only one based in real politick.