The third circuit handed down a shocking ruling today in the case of Petruska v. Gannon University. The case involves what is known as the ministerial exception, a legal doctrine well established by court precedent that says that anti-discrimination law cannot be applied to churches. As today's ruling notes, the ministerial exception was created "to protect church autonomy and avoid entangling government in religious affairs." But in this case, the court applies that exception in an extremely narrow way that no other court has done. And to make things even stranger, the decision was written by a dead judge.
Okay, the judge wasn't dead when he wrote the ruling, obviously. But Judge Edward Becker died last week, after this decision had been written but before it was released. If he were a Supreme Court justice, the case would likely have to be reheard and reargued with a new judge, but it doesn't appear that it's the same with an appeals court judge. At any rate, it will be interesting to see what happens with the case now.
The decision was actually on a motion to dismiss based upon the ministerial exception. A female employee of a Catholic college filed suit, claiming that she had been demoted solely because she is a woman and because she objected to sexual harrassment. The university filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a ministerial exception to such anti-discrimination legislation, and the district court granted that motion. The appeals court only ruled on whether the court was right to grant the dismissal, not on the merits of the case. So now the university can either appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds of the ministerial exception, or the case goes back to district court for a trial on the merits.
The ruling applies the ministerial exception very narrowly, saying that only those employment decisions that are based directly on established religious principles are protected by the exception; if the action is based upon a non-religious motivation, then the exception does not apply. But as the ruling itself notes, 6 other judicial districts have precedents in place that maintain that the ministerial exception applies regardless of whether the action under dispute was religious or non-religious in nature. So we now have a major split between judicial districts on how to apply the exception. Will the Supreme Court grant cert in this case to clear up the inconsistency between districts? Stay tuned.
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I'm by no means a legal expert, but this seems like a dangerous ruling. Do we really want courts to decide what is a "religious principle" and what isn't? How would one even create a standard for such a thing?
Evil Bender wrote:
That is precisely why the ministerial exception exists, and I do think it's dangerous. I think there is a serious argument to be made on the other side, and Marci Hamilton, who represents the plaintiff in the case, obviously did a good job of making it. I'm just not so sure it's a good idea when it comes to actual implementation.
On the one hand (it sounds like I'm being sarcastic, but I'm not) I don't think it's really reasonable for someone to expect ordinary civilized behavior from a religious organization.
On the other hand, I don't think that allowing courts to decide what is and is not a "religious principle" is all that dangerous. Most religious organizations write down and/or explicitly name and promote their religious principles, and any religious organization's own doctrine can serve to establish an objective basis.
I think that any self-described religious group should have the right to arbitrarily establish an explicit doctrine and operate their non-profit organization accordingly*. Even if we restrict the ministerial exception to such explicit doctrine, I don't see how anyone's religious freedom would be substantively compromised.
*Within reasonable limits, of course; I don't think many would support the religious freedom to engage in human sacrifice.
Ed, do you have any details about the nature of this alleged sexual harassment? Because to my mind, that's crucial information. I'm with PLP in thinking that the college's own self-description of their principles should be used to decide whether the behavior involved was in keeping with those principles (and thus to be expected by employees), or completely unrelated. If indeed unrelated, the college should not be granted the exception.